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Tim. TIME WHEN A MOTION FOR JUDGMENT MAY BE HEARD IN
WVEsT ViRGiNI.-The proceeding for obtaining judgment by motion, in lieu of an action at law, adopted in chapter 121 of the
West Virginia Code from the Code of Virginia; is recognized as a
plain instance of code pleading, although prevailing in essentially
common-law states.1 In the Virginia Code of 1849, the provisions
of which received construction in the leading case of Hale v. Chamberlain,' the statute provided that the defendant should have sixty
days' notice of the time when the motion would be made. The
statute further provided that the notice should be returned to the
clerk's office forty days before the motion should be heard.3 In
Hale v. Chamberlain the court emphasizes the fact that the primary
object of the statute was "to simplify and shorten pleadings and
other proceedings," but not necessarily to shorten the time within
which a case might go on the docket for a hearing. In fact, it is said
that "the legislature, from analogy to the time usually required to
get an action on the docket, fixed the time of the notice at sixty days,
I Burks, Pleading and Practice, 159.
2 18 Grat. 658 (Va. 1857).
B Va. Code, 1849, c, 167, 1 5.
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to be filed forty days before the motion is heard", for the express
purpose of making the proceeding by motion conform to the commonlaw procedure as to approximate time for maturing a case. 4 Chapter 177, section 1, of the Virginia Code of 1849, which corresponds
to chapter 131, section 1, of the West Virginia Code, provided,
among other things, that before every term of court the clerk
should make out a docket of "motions and actions" pending.
This statute was construed to mean that a motion or action could
not be heard at any particular term of court unless it had been
placed on the docket by the clerk prior to the beginning of such
term. In addition to the requirements of the analogy recognized
as stated above and the supposed requirements of the statute, the
opinion in Hale v. Chamberlain further states certain practical
reasons why it would not be expedient to hear a motion which had
not been placed on the docket before the beginning of the term.
It is said that
"A certain time is allowed before the term to get the case on
the docket that the defendant may prepare for a trial; and it
is set to a certain day on the docket, that he may know when
to summon his witnesses. But if a case may be matured during
the term, there is no provision for placing it on the docket; and
there would be no propriety in hearing it on the day named,
so as to interrupt the regular calling of the docket, and so to
give preference over cases entitled from their place on the docket
to a priority. The case would have to be called on the day
named, and continued to some day at the end of the days set,
or the defendant would be required with his witnesses to be
constantly in court to be ready whenever at some leisure interval the case should be called up for trial.'' 5
Since the decision of Hale v. Chamberlain, the Virginia statute
has undergone various changes, all intended to broaden and liberalize a remedy which seems to have been steadily gaining in
popularity over the common-law actions.8 The time of the notice
has been reduced from sixty to fifteen days.' Although at a time
subsequent to the decision of Hale v. Chamberlain the statute expressly required the notice to be returned to the clerk's office ten
days before the term of court at which the motion was to be heard,"
this requirement has long since been eliminated. On the contrary,
the Code of 1904 provides that judgment may be obtained "after
Hale v. Chamberlain, note 2 supra, p. 661.
5 Idem, p. 662.
6 Under the present statute there may be a recovery for unliquidated damages
for breach of a contract and even for a tort. Va. Code, 1919, § 6046.
'

7 Idem.

8 Burks, Pleading and Practice, 164.
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fifteen days' notice, which notice shall be returned to the clerk's
office of such court within five days after service of the same, and
9
after such fifteen days' notice the motion shalZ be docketed."
The statute as thus worded has been understood as dispensing
with the necessity of returning the notice to the clerk's office before the beginning of a term of court in order to have the motion
heard at such term." The code of 1919 is more emphatic to the
effect that the proceeding may be docketed and heard after the
beginning of the term. It provides for not less than fifteen days'
notice, and that the notice "shall be returned to the clerk's office
of such court within five days after service of the same, and when
so returned shall be forthwith docketed."' The requirement that
the notice shall be returned to the clerk's office within five days
after service obviously is not in order to get the proceeding on the
trial docket before the beginning of the term, but in 'order that the
proceeding shall have an official status as soon as practicable after
service of the notice, and perhaps too where practicable to permit
the clerk to docket regularly such notices as can be reasonably returned before the beginning of the term. The result is that in
Virginia a notice may now be served, returned, docketed and the
case tried, all after the beginning of the term.:2
The original West Virginia statute followed the provisions of
the Virginia Code in requiring sixty days notice to the defendant
and that the notice be returned to the clerk's office forty days
before the hearing.13 By acts of 1882's the time of notice was
reduced to thirty days and the notice was required to be returned
to the clerk's office twenty days before the hearing. The statute
remained thus until 1915, when the time of notice was reduced to
twenty days and the notice was required to be returned to the
clerk's office fifteen days before the hearing.' 5 The West Virginia statute has never contained any express provision, as in the
earlier Virginia Code, to the effect that the notice must be returned
to the clerk's office before the beginning of the term at which it is
to be heard. On the other hand, it has never contained any provision, as in the Virginia Codes of 1904 and 1919, which may be
construed as requiring or permitting the notice to be docketed
and the ease tried after the beginning of the term. However, the
West Virginia court has always followed the earlier Virginia deVa. Code, 1904, §3211. Italics ours.
Burks, Pleading and Practice, 164-165.
V1 Code, 1919, § 6046. Italics ours.
va.
22 Burks, Pleading and Practice, 164-165.
W. Va. Code, 1868, c. 121, § 6.
19 C. 74, § 6.
25 Acts 1915, c. 78; W. Va. Code, 1916, c. 121, §6.
10
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cisions, and in particular Hale v. Chamberlain, to the effect that
the case can not be tried unless the notice has been returned to the
clerk's office before the beginning of the term and the proceeding
docketed in accordance with the provisions of section 1 of chapter
131 of the West Virginia Code. Is such a requirement logical and
desirable?
The West Virginia court has adopted Hale v. Chamberlain and
other Virginia decisions under the earlier Virginia statutes as
precedents." Hence it definitely recognizes section 1 of chapter
131 of the West Virginia Code, providing that the clerk shall
before each term of court docket "motions and actions" pending,
as forbidding any motion to be heard at a particular term of
court unless the notice has been returned and the proceeding
docketed before the beginning of the term." Likewise it may be
understood as sanctioning all the practical reasons for such a requirement and the analogy heretofore noted as asserted in Hale
v. Chamberlain. Furthermore, the West Virginia court has recently placed emphasis on certain language of the statute as constituting an additional reason why the notice must come to the clerk's
office in vacation and be there docketed and can not be docketed
for a hearing during the term. The fact that the notice is rerequired to be returned to the clerk's office is urged as indicating
that it must undergo the process of docketing under section 1 of
chapter 131 prior to the beginning of the term before it can be
heard. "8' Notwithstanding all these reasons and the fact that the
West Virginia cases are plainly warranted by judicial precedent, the
modern Virginia practice having resulted from amendment of the
statutes, it is believed that the rule to which the West Virginia
court adheres is not in accord with the modern spirit and purpose
of the statute, even as it exists in West Virginia, and that no
great violence would be done to precedent if the rule were changed
by judicial decision, although no doubt it would be better to accomplish such a result by amendment of the statute.
It is believed that the analogy mentioned in Hale v. Chamberlain, if it was ever contemplated by the Virginia assembly, no
longer applies. While it may have been true at the time when the
latter case was decided that the object of the statute providing
for judgment upon motion was not to save time in maturing the
cause, the fact that the time of notice has since been gradually re1 Knox v. Horner, 58 w. Va. 136, 51 S. E. 979
Bank v. Dixon, 117 S. E. 685 (W. Va. 1923).

(1905) ; Citizens

National

17 Idam.

Superior v. Peters, 118 S. E. 540 (W. Va. 1923).
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dued from sixty to twenty days in the West Virginia statute
indicates that the saving of time in maturing the case is a very
important-perhaps the primary-consideration in the modern
statute. Perhaps the need for the statutory remedy is recognized
as most urgent and indispensable in those instances where the
plaintiff does not have sufficient time in which to mature a regular
common-law action. The mere fact that the statute provides for
return of the notice to the clerk's office is argumentative, but not
controlling, to the effect that the proceeding must be docketed in
the clerk's office in vacation before it can be heard in court. The
Virginia statute still has this provision that the notice shall be
returned to the clerk's office, and yet it has the further provision
that the proceeding shall be forthwith docketed, although the notice may have been served and returned after the beginning of
the term. Reasons have already been noted why the statute may
require the notice to be returned to the clerk's office without the
implication that it may not be docketed and tried in court if returned after the beginning of the term. The statute does not say
that the notice must be returned to the clerk's office before the
beginning of the term, nor does it say that the proceeding must
remain in the clerk's office any definite time whether returned before or after the beginning of the term. Section 1 of chapter 131
makes it the duty of the clerk to docket all "motions and actions"
pending at the beginning of the term, but it does not say that the
court may not docket motions pending after the beginning of the
term. Neither the clerk nor the court could properly docket a
common-law action which had not run its due course at rules
before the beginning of the term,1 9 because, by positive terms of
the statute, such an action would not be matured for trial until it
had properly run its course at rules. But a proceeding by motion
does not need to be matured at rules. One of the very objects of
making the notice returnable to a day in court would seem to be to
escape the delay of pleading at rules. While a common-law action
could not mature for trial after the beginning of a particular term
of court so as to be tried at that term, a proceeding for judgment
on motion may be matured after the term. In other words, there
is no reason why the provisions of section 1 of chapter 131 as applying to common-law actions should be applied by analogy with
the same strictness to the proceeding by motion. If the provisions
of the statute do not expressly or by necessary implication prohibit
19 Bennett v. Farmers' Mutual Fire Association,
(1916).

78 W. Va. 654, 90 S. E. 169
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the hearing of a motion when the notice has been returned after
the beginning of the term, then it remains to inquire whether procedural circumstances would render such a practice impracticable,
as urged in Hale v. Chamberlain.
It is urged in Hale v. Chamberlain, as hereinbefore quoted, that,
unless the case should be set for trial regularly on the trial docket
along with common-law actions matured for trial, the defendant
would not know on what day to appear in court with his witnesses,
unless the case should be tried on the day indicated in the notice.
On the other hand, if the case should be tried on that day, it is
suggested that the trial would likely interfere with the trial of
other cases regularly set on the docket for the same day. It is said
that the only way out of the difficulty would be to call the motion
on the day specified in the notice and set the case for trial at a
future day in the term. In the first place, it is believed that these
objections are overemphasized; and in the second place, it is believed that they apply largely to any proceeding for judgment by
motion, although the notice has been returned and the proceeding
docketed before the beginning of the term. Confined as the proceeding is in West Virginia to instances where the plaintiff is
entitled to recover money on contract, it is believed that in a comparatively large number of cases the plaintiff will take judgment
by default on his affidavit and no witnesses nor trial in the ordinary sense will be necessary. The few minutes necessary to call
the defendant and enter a default judgment on the day appointed
in the notice will not interfere with the trial of cases set on the
docket. On the other hand, if the defendant interposes a defense,
it is believed to be the regular practice, even in those cases where
the proceeding has been docketed prior to the beginning of the
term, for the defendant to appear and plead on the day appointed
in the notice (the first day of the term, for instance) and to set
a future day for trial of the case that will not interfere with the
regular docket. Or if necessary, under the law of continuances,
the trial may be continued to a subsequent term of court. The
fact that, in a proceeding by motion, the defendant has such a
comparatively short time in which to plead and the issues to be
tried are defined such a brief time before the trial will always
render chances for a trial at the term appointed in the notice more
or less precarious, if the defendant has any real defense to assert,
whatever the time and place of docketing the proceeding. Yet
why give the defendant an opportunity to postpone a recovery to
a future term of court, merely because the notice has not been
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docketed prior to the beginning of the term, without the necessity
of asserting even that he contemplates any defense? Experience
would seem to indicate in Virginia that the objections urged in
Hale v. Chamberlain either have not carried much weight in practice or have been counterbalanced by other considerations. The
evolution of the statute in Virginia is evidenced by numerous,
gradual and studied changes. The statutory proceeding has been
made available not only to recover unliquidated damages for breach
of a contract, but even for a recovery in a tort action. Yet the
notice may be returned and the motion docketed and heard after
the beginning of the term. A recent statement of the West Virginia court is significant. It says, referring to the defendant:
"He does not have to go to the trial calendar docket to be informed
that his adversary is seeking judgment against him at the next
' 20
term of court and on a day certain.
This discussion has been prompted by the fact that the West
Virginia Supreme Court has recently decided that process may
issue in an unlawful entry and detainer action during a term of
court returnable to such term and that the case may be docketed
and tried on the return day.21 Although it must be conceded that
there are statutory provisions in chapter 89 of the Code which
to a certain extent will differentiate an action of unlawful entry
and detainer from the proceeding to obtain judgment by motion
in respect to the matters under discussion, still it is believed that
this decision goes a long way toward indicating that the same
-L. C.
rule ought to prevail in both instances.

'0
2L

Citizens National Bank v. Dixon, note 16 supra.
Superior v. Peters, note 1S supra.
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